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TAKING FACT ANALYSIS SERIOUSLY 
Bernard Robertson* 
G.A. Vignaux** 
ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE: How To Do THINGS WITH FACTS BASED 
ON WIGMORE'S SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF. By Terence Anderson 
and William Twining. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co. 1991. 
Pp. xxx, 457. $24. 
INTRODUCTION 
The "new evidence scholarship" has so far consisted mainly of ar-
ticles and conference papers in which new evidence scholars argue in 
arcane disputes. 1 Some of the ideas have started to rub off in evidence 
textbooks,2 but few scholars have attempted written proselytization. 
One exception is William Twining,3 who in two previous books4 
challenged conventional evidence teachers to reconsider their basic 
principles. With Terence Anderson, s he has now published Analysis of 
Evidence with an accompanying Teacher's Manual (Manual). This 
was always intended to be the second limb of Twining's project, 6 but it 
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Massey University. M.A. 1977, Oxon; LL.M. 1989 Lond. - Ed. 
** Professor of Operations Research, Victoria University of Wellington. B.S. 1956, ARCS 
London; Ph.D. 1961, DIC London. - Ed. 
1. See, e.g., Symposium, Decision and Inference in Litigation, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 253 
(1991); Symposium, Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 377 
(1986). 
2. See RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF EVIDENCE (1991); ANDREW 
LIGERTWOOD, AUSTRALIAN EVIDENCE (1988). 
3. Quain Professor of Jurisprudence, University College, London. 
4. WILLIAM TwINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE (1990) [hereinafter TWINING, RETHINK· 
ING EVIDENCE]; WILLIAM TwlNING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 
(1985) [hereinafter TwINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE]. 
5. Professor of Law, University of Miami. 
6. See WILLIAM TWINING, Introduction: The Story of a Project, in TWINING, RETHINKING 
EVIDENCE, supra note 4, at 5-7. Twining has explored the boundaries and content of Evidence in 
a number of essays now collected in TwINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE, supra note 4, and at-
tempted to uncover its conceptual and theoretical underpinnings in TWINING, THEORIES OF 
EVIDENCE, supra note 4. As a result, a subject previously regarded, in the U.K. and New Zea· 
land at any rate, as a "professional" subject to be taught in a technical fashion has become a 
battleground on which no fundamental assumption is safe. Part of the motivation for the study 
was to consider the future of a subject normally conceived of as a body of rules, when the rules 
were being steadily eroded or abolished in most Commonwealth jurisdictions. Today Evidence 
courses in the U.K., New Zealand, and Australia are moving in one of two directions: either 
toward what in the U.S. would be termed "Constitutional Criminal Law," motivated by legisla· 
tion such as the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 60 (Eng.), and the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act, No. 109 (1990), or toward exploring the process of "proof," motivated by 
writers such as Twining and Sir Richard Eggleston. See SIR RICHARD EGGLESTON, EVIDENCE, 
PROOF AND PROBABILITY (2d ed. 1983). 
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is also the first book from the new evidence movement designed to be 
picked up by noninitiates and used for teaching. · 
I. FACT ANALYSIS 
Analysis of Evidence seeks to breathe new life into Wigmore's 
largely ignored Science of Judicial Proof. 7 where Wigmore set out to 
develop a novum organum, a rigorous method of thinking about facts 
in legal cases. The structure of argument and proof, he pointed out, 
was ripe for systematic study, because it had been regarded as a skill to 
be picked up through working with more senior practitioners who had 
not themselves been trained in fact analysis. 8 
Although Analysis of Evidence addresses other evidence analysis 
techniques such as the narrative method9 and the trial book, 10 the 
Wigmore Chart serves as the book's centerpiece. The Wigmore Chart 
aims "to determine rationally the net persuasive effect of a mixed mass 
of evidence."11 It provides a formalized scheme, necessary because 
"the mind is unable to juxtapose consciously a larger number of 
ideas." Consequently, "each coherent group of detailed constituent 
ideas must be reduced in consciousness to a single idea; until the mind 
can consciously juxtapose them with due attention to each, so as to 
produce its single final idea."12 · 
The formalized scheme is achieved by breaking down the case's 
evidence into propositions, each containing a single point (see Table 
1). The propositions may be matters provided by depositions, infer-
ences drawn from witness evidence, generalizations that contribute to 
the drawing of inferences, or even alternative explanations for events 
dreamed up by the chartist. The chartist draws a hierarchical chart 
showing the relationships between these propositions. Thus, in Figure 
7. JOHN H. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF AS GIVEN BY LOGIC, PSYCHOL-
OGY, AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS (3d ed. 1937) (previ-
ously published as The Principles of Judicial Proof in 1913 and 1931). 
8. Id. at 4. 
9. Wigmore scorned the narrative method, in which the evidence is simply recited and classi-
fied according to which matters it is relevant to, though even that requires the lawyer to think in 
more Wigmorian terms than does the mere telling of a story. Anderson and Twining see more 
merit in narrative as a method of conveying information to the factfinder (p. 158). They also 
explore the ideas of theory, a legally significant, logical statement of what a party has to prove; 
story, a narration of the relevant events; and theme, an idea around which the presentation of the 
case in court is built. Appreciation of the difference between these concepts is vital for both the 
practitioner and the scholar. For discussion of a failure to distinguish between theory and story, 
see Bernard Robertson & G.A. Vignaux, Extending the Conversation about Bayes, 13 CARDOZO 
L. REv. 629, 631-32 (1991). 
10. The "trial book" is simply a lawyer's device for organizing what he or she needs to try 
a particular lawsuit. Typically, it will include pleadings, checklists, copies of documents to 
be introduced and statements or depositions to be used, outlines for opening and closing, 
outlines or anticipated "scripts" for direct and cross-examination of witnesses, jury instruc-
tions, and memoranda of law .... P. 266. 
11. John H. Wigmore, The Problem of Proof. 8 ILL. L. REV. 77, 79 (1913). 
12. Id. at 80 (emphasis omitted). 
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1, which shows a portion of a Wigmore Chart from Analysis of Evi-
dence, Witness 3's statement (7) is evidence for (6), which in turn sup-
ports proposition (5). But proposition (18), supported by propositions 
(16) and (17), leads us to downplay the probative value of (6) on (5). 13 
TABLE 1: A PARTIAL LIST OF PROPOSITIONS 
FOR FIGURE 1 (P. 147) 
5. X left Y's house at 5:00 p.m. on January 1. 
6. W[itness]3 saw X leave Y's house at 5:00 p.m. on January 1. 
7. W3: I saw X leave Y's house at 5:00 p.m. on January 1. 
16. The sun had set before 5:00 p.m. on January 1. 
17. A claimed eyewitness identification made after the sun has set is 
doubtful. 
18. It may have been someone other than X whom W3 saw leave Y's 
house. 
FIGURE 1: PART OF A BASIC WIGMORE CHART (P. 148) 
7 
In practice the chart and the list of propositions develop interactively. 
Early attempts to draw a chart usually reveal deficiencies in one's list 
of propositions, which accordingly starts to expand. This forces one to 
consider exactly how items of evidence prove different propositions. 
This analytical process assists a number of stages of the legal pro-
cess. For the investigator, it can help to identify possibilities and indi-
cate which evidence should be sought to prove or disprove those 
possibilities; for the prosecutor, it serves as a checking device to ensure 
that the most appropriate provable charges have been laid and to iden-
tify any further investigation required; for the lawyer preparing for 
13. The different shaped symbols hint at the type of proposition or evidence involved. For 
example, the circle depicts circumstantial evidence or inferred propositions; the open angle iden· 
tifies arguments providing alternative explanations for an inference; and the square depicts testi· 
monial assertions. P. 145. 
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trial, it serves the additional purpose of enabling an issue-by-issue con-
struction of the case for presentation to the jury; and for the historian 
examining a cause celebre, it offers a tool for rigorously examining the 
facts and arguments proffered and for considering the effects of new 
information. Indeed, Analysis of Evidence emphasizes that the first 
step in any successful analysis is to determine one's standpoint. This is 
achieved by asking the questions: Who am I?; At what stage in what 
process am I?; and What am I trying to achieve? The second question 
emphasizes that the lawyer and investigator are involved in dynamic 
processes, in which information and priorities may change during the 
period from an initial incident or consultation to trial. 
The value of fact analysis has long been recognized in a number of 
fields. 14 Two recent developments have caused the legal world to take 
renewed notice of fact analysis. First, large law firms increasingly use 
computer-based litigation support systems, and courts also use com-
puters for managing the evidence in complex cases. At present these 
are only sophisticated storage and retrieval systems; a system that ac-
tually helps the litigator to structure the case is an obvious next step.15 
Second, the move toward skills-based legal training in a number of 
jurisdictions has created demand for teachable systems for analyzing 
cases. Many lawyers, in the course of their practice, work out more or 
less formal systems for displaying the structure of a case. This demon-
strates the value of such systems. If legal training included such an 
analytical framework, junior lawyers could avoid much unnecessary 
distress. 
Neville Carter, working alone from a copy of Wigmore's Science, 
designed one system for analyzing cases for the New Zealand Law 
Professionals Course.16 This model starts at Level One, the appropri-
ate sources of law, from which one identifies Level Two, the cause of 
action or charge. The elements of the cause of action are determined 
at Level Three. Level Four consists of those propositions that consti-
tute the matters to be proved at Level Three. Level Five consists of 
the evidence from witnesses and documents. The process of inference, 
upon which Analysis of Evidence concentrates, takes place largely be-
tween Levels Four and Five. In a minority of instances, a Level Four 
proposition is inferred directly from an item of evidence, but in most 
cases a more complex process of inference is involved. Often this will 
require combining inferences from items of evidence. All this activity 
takes place "between" Level Four and the bottom level, and it seems 
14. See, e.g., DAVID SCHUM, EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ANA-
LYST (1987). 
15. Academics are attempting to develop such systems. See, e.g., David A. Schum & Peter 
Tillers, Marshalling Evidence Throughout the Process of Fact-Investigation: A Simulation -
Parts I to IV (1989), Reports 89-01 to 89-04 (unpublished manuscript). 
16. New Zealand Law Socy. Seminar, Winning Your Case - Structuring Proof and Closing 
Evidentiary Loopholes (New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 1988) (Neville Carter, leader). 
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sensible to insert a riew level into the scheme so that the charting of 
the inference process can be properly discussed. The current version 
of the model therefore has six levels (see Figure 2). 17 
FIGURE 2: THE 6-LEVEL MODEL FOR FACT ANALYSIS 
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CAUSE OF ACTION 













Item Item Item 
of of of 
Evid Evid Evid 
of of of 







































The Carter model relates the various levels to statements of claim, 
particulars, and other procedural aspects of the New Zealand legal 
system. Thus, Carter takes Wigmore's basic idea and adapts it to one 
particular standpoint: that of the lawyer preparing for trial in a partic-
ular jurisdiction. Oddly enough, this is the standpoint from which 
17. New Zealand Law Socy. Seminar, Preparing to Win: Analyzing Facts in Legal Cases 
(New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 1991) (Bernard Robertson, leader). 
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Wigmore thought he was writing. 18 Carter's work and Analysis of Evi-
dence, however, show that Wigmore provided only the logical core, to 
be adapted and extended to fit the requirements of various 
standpoints. 
Analysis of Evidence provides basic instruction in drawing a chart 
together with real and :fictional cases suitable for the beginner. The 
book provides extensive quotations from Wigmore's original work and 
authorial commentary, some of which are expanded in the Manual 
Because an evidence teacher cannot easily find cases that neatly test 
the various aspects of fact analysis, the uninitiated teacher will find 
this compendium most helpful. 
This is a process that can only be learned by doing, thus students 
and teachers face a lot of hard work. The authors are sanguine about 
the task of teaching such a system; they state that giving feedback is 
easier than performing the analysis in the first place (Manual, pp. x-
xi). Our own experience suggests that the best way for teachers to 
learn to teach fact analysis is for them to think their way through a 
major exercise themselves. 19 Their task may be mainly to "incite, ex-
cite, and advise," but they can only be credible by providing the clear 
sense of direction that comes from having traveled the road first. 
This is particularly true in view of the standard criticisms made 
upon first introduction to such systems. Busy practitioners often state 
that they do not have the time and energy to chart every, or even any, 
case in this way. Other lawyers maintain that this system only puts on 
paper what they already do in their heads. This reflects the more aca-
demic debate about whether Wigmorian analysis is a descriptive or 
prescriptive system and, if it is prescriptive, whether the patient needs 
a cure. The answer, sufficient for practical purposes, is twofold: first, 
Wigmorian analysis is an attempt to capture the way we think when 
we think at our best; second, the experience of formally conducting a 
major analysis causes the process to be internalized. This exercise will 
actually improve one's analytical skills without always having to use 
pencil and paper. This has certainly been our own experience, but to 
convince a class one needs to have had this experience oneself. 
Once one has tried out the basic techniques, one can proceed to the 
more sophisticated problems provided and issues raised in Analysis of 
Evidence. Twining devotes considerable attention to the Edith 
Thompson case,20 but one will soon find other cases, perhaps more 
local or topical, to use as centerpieces. Antipodean examples are pro-
18. Wigmore, supra note 11, at 77-79. 
19. This view is supported by comments to us by instructors in the early days of the new style 
Professional Course in New Zealand, who were pitched into teaching fact analysis with little 
preparation. 
20. For earlier evidence of Twining's fascination with this case, see WILLIAM TwINING, 
Anatomy of a Cause celebre: The Case of Edith Thompson, in TwINING, RETHINKING EVI-
DENCE, supra note 4, at 262. 
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vided by the Thomas 21 and Chamberlain 22 cases. 
Analysis of Evidence was, the authors tell us, ten years in the mak-
ing (p. xxix). During that time the authors taught fact analysis to 
classes at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, and in the Manual 
they give us the benefit of their experience. They and others writing 
on fact analysis also have improved on Wigmore's work. These im-
provements can take two forms: they can extend the analysis to solve 
problems impossible under traditional Wigmorian analysis or they can 
improve the internal detail of chart construction. 
The greatest shortcoming ofWigmore's system is that the choice of 
ultimate probandum has to be made before the analysis can begin. 
Thus, the standpoint is that of a lawyer at a fairly late stage of a case 
preparing for trial, or of an investigator who has formulated a fairly 
clear hypothesis as to what happened. Even then the ultimate pro-
bandum is regarded as a purely factual matter. Although Analysis of 
Evidence indicates that the choice of the ultimate probandum depends 
upon the procedural and substantive law, the method does not rigor-
ously consider these factors. 
Scholars have addressed the problem of how to get to the ultimate 
probandum from the mess of facts brought to an attorney by a client 
or complainant. Schum and Tillers suggest devices such as chronolo-
gies, analysis by issue, analysis by factual hypothesis, and the method 
of multiple working hypotheses.23 The least useful solution has been 
in longest practical use - the organization of evidence witness by 
witness. 
Herein potentially lies the most useful development of fact analysis 
in professional legal training. Because problems are raised in particu-
lar classes, the law student knows that a problem involves, for exam-
ple, contracts, criminal law, or property. Clients do not bring lawyers 
their problems categorized in this way. Thus, the lawyer's first ques-
tion has to be "what area(s) oflaw are we concerned with?" Often this 
may be obvious, but experience shows that the obvious can be mislead-
ing. The trap to avoid is singlemindedly following the obvious while 
ignoring possible alternative courses of action. Applications for leave 
to file late amendments to complaints often bear witness that a practi-
tioner has fallen into this trap. An exercise at a New Zealand Law 
Society Continuing Legal Education seminar was designed to sensitize 
students to this problem.24 Students received a disorganized letter 
from an aggrieved businessman about the collapse of an important 
21. Thomas v. Regina, 1972 N.Z.L.R. 34 (1971). 
22. Chamberlain v. Regina, 51 A.L.R. 225 (1984) (Austl.). This is the case dramatized in the 
film A CRY IN THE DARK (Warner Bros. 1988). 
23. David A. Schum & Peter Tillers, Marshalling Evidence for Adversary Litigation, 13 CAR· 
DOZO L. REV. 657 (1991). 
24. New Zealand Law Society Seminar, Preparing to Win, supra note 17. 
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deal. Whether or not a contract exists is deliberately doubtful, but 
many seminar participants devoted great energy to the contract ques-
tions and failed to consider estoppel and other areas of law. Systems 
are needed to help lawyers identify the most appropriate ultimate pro-
bandum. Schum and Tillers and, dare we say, the present reviewers 
have provided a start in this direction.25 
As regards the second form of improvement - the internal reform 
of the chart - Anderson and Twining recommend a radical simplifi-
cation of Wigmore's notation. Wigmore proposed numerous symbols 
and variations that differentiate between defense and prosecution evi-
dence and kinds of evidence. Few of these distinctions serve any par-
ticularly useful purpose, and the modem tendency is to use as few 
different symbols as possible. The important question is whether a 
useful distinction can be made. Anderson and Twining offer two sug-
gestions: a symbol to indicate hearsay evidence and a symbol to indi-
cate generalizations for which no evidence is offered. The second 
suggestion is particularly useful. As the authors point out, Wigmore 
himself failed to realize the great virtue of his system: that it makes 
explicit the generalizations and assumptions upon which the reasoning 
crucially depends (pp. 66-69). The extent to which a case's reasoning 
process depends upon such assumptions is graphically shown by the 
use of symbols to identify them. These generalizations (as opposed to 
the facts asserted) may tum out to be the vulnerable points in an oppo-
nent's argument. One of the most valuable uses of the Wigmore Chart 
is in exposing these weaknesses. 
In the course of teaching fact analysis, we have found that the dis-
tinction between two different structures of argument suggests a 
change in notation. In one case (Figure 3(a)) a particular probandum 
is supported by a series of probans, 26 each increasing the probability of 
the probandum. If any probans are removed, the probandum would 
still be supported; conversely, all the probans could be true and yet the 
probandum could be uncertain. In other cases (Figure 3(b)), every 
proposition supporting an argument must be true to give rise to the 
probandum. In such cases the probandum is often a logical combina-
tion of the probans; if they are true, the probandum follows. The link 
betweenprobans andprobandum is one of deduction.27 To distinguish 
the two situations in one's diagrams seems useful but is difficult to do 
with the form used by Wigmore, and copied by many students, in 
which lines lie only vertically or horizontally. This form does not 
25. See supra note 17, supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
26. We are aware that the plural of probans is probantia but it seems ostentatious and obfus-
catory to use it. 
27. See infra note 29 and accompanying text. This matter is more fully discussed by Justice 
Roden in Regina v. Shepherd (No. 3), 39 A. Crim. R. 266 (1988) (Aust!.). See the commentary 
in Bernard Robertson & G.A. Vignaux, Inferring Beyond Reasonable Doubt, 11 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 431 (1991). 
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guide the eye intuitively along the structure of the argument. Alterna-
tively one can use lines that proceed directly, at an oblique angle, from 
probans to probandum. One can then distinguish the two structures of 
argument on the chart by borrowing a convention from the artificial 
intelligence disciplines such as shown on diagram 3(b ). 
FIGURE 3: Two FORMS OF SUPPORT FOR PROBANDUM H 
As evidence teachers, we have also encountered difficulties when a 
number of versions of some event have to be considered. An example 
is provided by the various ways in which the hapless Moses Young 
might have died.28 The probandum in the case is that he died as a 
result of drinking poisoned whisky knowingly given him by the Ac-
cused. An intermediate proposition such as Young died of poisoning is 
required. But the facts suggest that Young may have died of old age, 
of the colic, or from an injury sustained in a recent accident. In ana-
lyzing the facts, the usual first approach is to draw a chart in the man-
ner of Figure 4. 
This structure presents a conundrum. Every proposition assumes 
the negative of its converse, yet in the chart the converse proposition 
has to be made explicit. The analyst also faces a difficulty in framing 
the alternative proposition X. On one hand, it could be identical to the 
probandum, but this would be an otiose result. Conversely, if no prop-
osition X appears, the chart becomes rather disorganized. To deal 
with this problem one could adopt a divided "sausage" with each of 
the various possibilities having a compartment. Probans can then be 
connected with the appropriate compartments. The chartist then 
must allocate some sort of plausibility to the various alternatives and 
proceed with the process of inference. 
28. See Hatchett v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. 1026 (1882). The case appears in JOHN H. WIG· 
MORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF 66-71 (1931). 
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FIGURE 4: A WIGMORE CHART FOR THE ALTERNATIVE 
EXPLANATIONS OF MOSES YOUNG'S DEATH 
Young died from 
Age 
FIGURE 5: THE "SAUSAGE" NODE 
1451 
Likewise it might be worth developing set diagrams for some com-
mon inference structures. 29 Thus the logical structure of an argument 
about identification can be exposed. This structure would apply to any 
identification proposition, such as the accused was the culprit. Such a 
statement may well be the ultimate probandum or the penultimate pro-
bandum and may depend upon other evidence, but if it depends upon 
identification it may be charted as in Figure 6: 
29. While making students think things out for themselves is valuable, if we can save them 
time and effort by showing them what we have thought out in previous years, then perhaps they 
can develop further insights that have not occurred to us. 
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FIGURE 6: A WIGMORE CHART FOR IDENTIFICATION 
Figure 6 represents a simple case of identity of the Culprit (pro-
bandum, HJ. Three pieces of evidence are available: blood typing 
from a bloodstain at the scene (BJ, an eyewitness identification (E), 
and a matching footprint (F). A more precise definition of the pro-
positions is listed in Table 2: 
TABLE 2: PROPOSITIONS FOR IDENTITY 
H = "The Accused and the Culprit are the same person" 
E = "An eyewitness identifies the Accused as being at the scene" 
F = "A footprint matching the Accused's shoe was found at the scene" 
B = "The blood types of both the Accused and the Culprit are X" 
B* "Only 1 in 50 of the population share blood group X" 
C = "The Culprit's blood type was X" 
A - "The Accused's blood-type is X" 
In this example, only the blood-typing evidence, B, is taken to any 
detail. We know the blood type is X and that it is shared by only one 
in fifty of the population. This is important inferential information. A 
more common blood type would provide less probative weight for 
identity. Proposition B* is a generalization indicating the value of evi-
dence B rather than its truth.30 Thus in more abstract terms the iden-
tification structure has propositions as shown in Table 3: 
30. The structure found in the area of B and B* would be repeated in the "F" sector of the 
chart. 
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TABLE 3: PROPOSITIONS FOR IDENTITY IN ABSTRACT FORM 
B "The Accused and the Culprit share certain characteristics" 
B* - "Those characteristics are so unusual that the similarity has 
probative value" 
C = "The Culprit's characteristics were X, Y, Z" 
A "The Accused's characteristics are X, Y, Z" 
This provides an abstract framework for considering any identifi-
cation problem. Doubtless analogous structures could be developed 
for other common inferential problems. 
We have no doubt of the chart method's efficacy as a teaching and 
explanatory aid. Whenever an argument has to be picked apart, it is 
useful to state one's propositions in a formal style and use a diagram to 
show how they link up. Before formally introducing fact analysis, 
Robertson acclimatizes students to Wigmorian analysis by using it as a 
teaching aid while discussing subjects such as relevance and similar 
facts.31 Likewise, articles and judgments, which discuss whether one 
proposition can properly be inferred from another, could often be clar-
ified by the use of such a method. The argument by Peter Mirfield in 
An Alternative Future for Corroboration Warnings provides an exam-
ple where the method could be useful. 32 While the passage is written 
with admirable lucidity, perhaps the writer and certainly the reader 
would have benefited from a chart of the argument. The use of charts 
by Their Lordships in the course of their disagreements in Regina v. 
Kearley 33 about exactly what can be inferred might have been novel 
but would have been of considerable assistance in clarifying both the 
authors' and readers' understanding. 
II. FACT ANALYSIS AND PROBABILITY 
Anderson and Twining treat fact analysis and probability as sepa-
rate issues. The book contains an appendix on "Probability and 
Proof" written by Philip Dawid (pp. 385-441). The Manual contains 
further material, including a reprint of Twining's article. 34 The au-
thors, however, leave the reader unclear as to whether or how the two 
subjects are connected. 
Both Twining and Dawid treat probability as essentially a part of 
statistics. This results in a presentation that leads to arguments about 
the applicability of probability to legal cases and dismays many stu-
31. As an example of the value of graphical techniques in explaining legal concepts, see Rich-
ard D. Friedman, Route Analysis of Credibility and Hearsay, 96 YALE L.J. 667 (1987). 
32. Peter Mirfield, An Alternative Future for Corroboration Warnings, 107 LA w Q. REv. 450, 
457-58 (1991). 
33. [1992) 2 App. Cas. 345. 
34. Manual, pp. 167-76 (reprinting William Twining, Debating Probabilities, 2 LIVERPOOL 
L. REV. 51 (1980)). 
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dents who pursued law hoping to escape from mathematics.35 Our 
own experience indicates that many students put the probability mate-
rial into a separate conceptual box, which remains locked once the 
material is covered. 36 
In the Manual the authors describe the development of their ap-
proach to probability and their own discussions about whether it is a 
separate matter or a central issue (pp. 68-70). We have been through a 
similar process which has recently culminated in the realization37 that 
probability must be approached as an extension of logic, and that sta-
tistics is a special case, or worse, a series of special cases, of the use of 
probability. As Twining perceptively stated in Debating Probabilities, 
"[t]he life of the lawyer of the future will need to include logic as well 
as statistics. " 38 
If probability is a matter of logic, then clearly Wigmorian analysis 
and Bayesian analysis of a case are closely connected, if not the same 
operation. To assess the probabilities, the case must be divided into 
simple, verifiable propositions with their logical relationships repre-
sented in some way. This may implicitly occur in the act of creating a 
Wigmore Chart. The decision to draw a line connecting one symbol to 
another suggests that the one symbol is relevant to the other, which 
can only mean that the chartist has decided that the symbols' degree 
of association (measured by the likelihood ratio) is high enough to 
compensate for the additional complication in the chart. 
Consideration of more detailed matters also reveals a close connec-
tion between a Wigmore Chart and Bayesian analysis. The Rule of 
Total Probability, also known as "The Extension of the Conversa-
tion," states that, in considering the probability that H is true, we 
must consider that H might be true when A is true and also when A is 
false. We must combine these with the probabilities that A is true or 
false. In formal notation: 
P(H) = P(HIA) P(A) + P(HlnotA) P(notA). 
If there are two items of evidence (A and B) to be considered in assess-
35. For various reasons probabilistic analysis is usually referred to in the legal literature as 
Bayesian analysis, and we use this phrase hereafter. For discussion, see Robertson & Vignaux, 
supra note 9, at 629. 
36. In our teaching, Professor Vignaux contributed to every seminar in the LL.M. Evidence 
course. It was thus much harder for the students to duck probabilistic argument than in a course 
where a statistician gives a discrete set of lectures and then leaves. 
37. We were enormously assisted by reading the published and unpublished work of E.T. 
Jaynes, Wayman Crow Professor of Physics at Washington University, St. Louis, Mo. E.g., E.T. 
Jaynes, Clearing up Mysteries - The Original Goal, in MAXIMUM ENTROPY AND BAYSEAN 
METHODS 1 (J. Skilling ed., 1989); E.T. Jaynes, Probability Theory as Logic, in MAXIMUM EN· 
TROPY AND BAYESIAN METHODS 1 (Paul F. Fougere ed., 1990). 
38. Twining, supra note 34, at 64. This argument is developed in full in Bernard Robertson 
& G. A. Vignaux, Probability- The Logic of the Law, 13 O~FORD J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcom-
ing 1993). This contrast, between probability as logic and statistics as usually taught, means that 
students with backgrounds in conventional statistics, far from being able to tackle extra work, as 
asserted in the Manual (p. 71 n.8), may have more to unlearn. 
May 1993] Fact Analysis 1455 
ing the probability of A then we must consider all four combinations 
where A and Bare both true, either one is true, or both are false. Thus 
we have, in formal notation: 
P(H) = P(HIA, B) P(A,B) 
+ P(HlnotA, B) P(notA, B) 
+ P(HIA, notB) P(A, notB) 
+ P(HlnotA, notB) P(notA, notB). 
A or B may themselves depend on evidence (C and D), in which case 
the conversation is extended to include them. This can easily be visu-
alized in a Wigmore Chart by a descending tree structure expanding at 
each level as shown in Figure 7. Here C and D both affect the plausi-
bility of A. Propositions A and B tend to support H. The bar across 
the C-A link indicates that C tends to reduce the plausibility of A. The 
arrows indicate support. 
FIGURE 7: CASCADING INFERENCE AND "EXTENDING THE 
CONVERSATION" 
As we have argued elsewhere, this may resolve the long-running 
debate between "holists" and "particularists."39 Bayesian analysis is 
usually assumed to be a particularist rather than a holist device. But 
we see from Figure 7 that Bayesian analysis does indeed offer a tool for 
considering a case from the top down as well as from the bottom up, 
and for assessing the probability of the prosecution's case given all the 
evidence. 40 
39. Robertson & Vignaux, supra note 9, at 634-36. 
40. Conditional probability also offers a solution to the semantic difficulty of indicating ex-
actly which point a proposition is about. Ordinary use of language imprecisely discerns which 
precise point a proposition is making. The sentence Hatchett gave Young a poisoned bottle, for 
example, could be intended to focus on whether a bottle Hatchett admittedly gave Young was 
poisoned, Hatchett gave Young a bottle (that happened to be poisoned), or it was Young to 
whom Hatchett gave the poisoned bottle. The clearest way of resolving this difficulty seems to be 
to frame the propositions conditionally: given that Hatchett gave a bottle to Young, it was 
poisoned. 
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Traditionally in a Wigmore Chart, evidence is regarded as support-
ing or undermining a particular hypothesis. But no piece of evidence 
can in itself support or undermine a hypothesis. Evidence can only 
help us to choose between hypotheses. Often the alternative hypothe-
sis is left unstated, but this is not conducive to clarity and seems partly 
responsible for the belief that some evidence can have an "intrinsic 
value," whereas the value of any evidence depends upon the hypothe-
ses being compared. In the problem of how to represent alternative 
explanations for a particular event, 41 we adopt an expanded "sausage" 
node that contains all the alternative hypotheses rather than having a 
separate node for each. Relevant evidence is then connected in the 
chart to this expanded node rather than to any particular hypothesis. 
Once this is done, one's view of the evidence is changed. Rather than 
seeing particular pieces of evidence as supporting particular hypothe-
ses, one sees more clearly that the role of each item of evidence is to 
discriminate among the alternatives. One considers the probability of 
the evidence given each hypothesis, which means that one is starting 
with arrows downward from the hypothesis to the evidence rather than 
upward as the arrows in a Wigmore Chart normally flow. This leads 
to calculating likelihood ratios to assess how well the evidence suc-
ceeds in discriminating between pairs of hypotheses. Bayesian analysis 
and Wigmorian analysis have then been combined. 
III. WIGMORE AND DECISION ANALYSIS 
Wigmore viewed his system as "only an attempt at a working 
method, which may suffice for lack of any other yet accessible."42 
Those writing about Wigmorian analysis eighty years later must there-
fore consider whether subsequent developments might have overtaken 
Wigmore. 
Wigmore developed his system years ahead of any similar methods 
published in the scientific literature.43 In recent years other disci-
plines, such as Operations Research, have developed graphical meth-
ods that deal with formal analysis of decisionmaking. These include 
decision trees, influence diagrams, and Bayes networks. These quanti-
tative techniques assist the analyst not only in describing the problem 
and communicating information about structure, but also in calculat-
ing the effect of the truth of one proposition or piece of evidence on the 
plausibility of others. 
In this section we propose to examine decision trees, influence dia-
grams, and Bayes networks in tum and compare each with Wigmore 
diagrams. This will be done with the aid of examples, including an 
41. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
42. Wigmore, supra note 11, at 79. 
43. See, e.g., Sewell Wright, Correlation and Causation, 20 J. AGRIC. RES. 557 (1921). 
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identification problem. In this way we hope to examine whether these 
modem methods have advantages over the "attempt at a working 
method" and to see what light they cast on Wigmore diagrams and 
vice versa. 
Decision trees bear a superficial resemblance to Wigmore Charts. 
As well as Wigmore's proposition nodes, they have nodes representing 
decisions and values of outcomes, but these do not have to be used and 
we subsequently ignore them in this presentation. Different values for 
propositions (such as true and false) have their own nodes that are 
linked by arcs giving conditional probability values. The trees conven-
tionally work horizontally rather than vertically like Wigmore Charts. 
For example, in Figure 8(a), nodes C and NC represent cloudy and 
noncloudy weather.44 R and NR represent rain and nonrain in the 
afternoon. Conditional probabilities are associated with the links be-
tween them. For example, link C-R is associated with conditional 
probability P(RI C) - that is, the probability that it will rain in the 
afternoon, (R), given that it is cloudy in the morning, (C). The tree 
can also be used for inference, to calculate the probability that it was 
cloudy in the morning given the evidence that it rained in the after-
noon, P(CIR). The decision tree is beneficial because many of the cal-
culations can be carried out directly on the diagram. 
Professor Richard Friedman, in his modification of decision trees, 
combines nodes that lead to the same final state (see Figure S(b)).45 
Thus the node R via C (the event that it rains in the afternoon and was 
cloudy, C: in the morning) and the node R via NC (the event that it 
rains in the afternoon and was not cloudy, NC: in the morning) would 
be combined into a single R node. This more closely resembles the 
corresponding Wigmore Chart and has some distinct advantages when 
summing the effects of the various paths to each of the end nodes. At 
an intermediate stage, though, it may be more useful to keep (R CJ 
and (R NC) separate, because they may give rise to different conse-
quences as we go farther into the tree. The same problem arises in 
drawing a Wigmore Chart when a proposition (piece of evidence) 
plays more than one role. The proposition can be represented either 
by a single symbol with multiple radiating arcs or by a separate sym-
bol at each point in the chart at which the proposition is relevant. 
Influence diagrams generalize and simplify decision trees (see Fig-
ure 8(c)). They also have nodes for decisions and values of outcomes. 
They can handle problems that decision trees cannot, but they are not 
so transparent to use; much of the information is buried in associated 
tables. Bayes networks are influence diagrams without nodes for deci-
sions and values of outcomes. 
44. The example is borrowed from Professor Richard Friedman's Omphalos. See Richard 
D. Friedman, A Diagrammatic Approach to Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REv. 571, 572 (1986). 
45. Id. at 580-81. 
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FIGURE 8: A DECISION TREE (A), A CORRESPONDING FRIEDMAN 
ROUTE DIAGRAM (B), AND AN INFLUENCE DIAGRAM OR BAYES 
NETWORK (c), FOR THE 0MPHALOS WEATHER PROBLEM 
(a) Decision Tree 
( c) Influence Diagram or 
Bayes Network 
P(C) P(RIC) 
(b) Route Diagram 
Bayes networks set out, in an acyclic network46 of nodes connected 
by directed arcs,47 the propositions to be proved, and the data (in the 
form of propositions) on which we expect to base proof. These form 
the nodes of the network. The nodes represent all the alternative val-
ues of a hypothesis. They correspond to the "sausage" node we sug-
gested above.48 Thus, node C in Figure 8(c) corresponds to both the C 
and NC nodes in the decision tree and route diagram. Directed arcs 
(arrows) between the nodes indicate influences, that is, conditional de-
pendence (more precisely, the absence of an arc joining two nodes as-
serts conditional independence between them). Conditional 
probabilities are not associated with the arcs but with each node, the 
46. A network where no loops or connections are allowed - in fact, where circular reason-
ing is forbidden. 
47. These are lines with a direction, or arrows. 
48. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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conditioning propositions being those nodes linked to it by incoming 
arcs. Thus the node for rain in the afternoon, R (corresponding to the 
nodes R and NR), has an associated conditional probability table 
P(RI C) and the arc CR tells us that C is a conditioning proposition 
(i.e., it influences R). Conditional probability tables must be estab-
lished for each proposition (node). At this stage the diagram repre-
sents the problem prior to the receipt of evidence. It represents all the 
possible values that one assumes the evidence could take. 
Figure 9 represents in Bayes network form the same problem of 
identification shown in Figure 6. Nodes A, B, C, E, F, and H represent 
propositions (see Table 2). H is the hypothesis we seek to establish 
(the ultimate probandum ), A and Care items of evidence to be testified 
to by witnesses, and E and F are intermediate propositions inferred 
from other witness evidence. 
FIGURE 9: A BAYES NETWORK FOR IDENTIFICATION 
Node B can take on not only the value X but any other blood type. 
Assume node B can have one of the values BJ, B2, B3, B4, or "No 
Match" where BJ-B4 would each correspond to both the Accused and 
the Culprit having the same blood type such as A, B, AB, or 0, and 
"No Match" would mean that the blood types of Culprit and Accused 
do not match. We also have information about the frequencies of the 
blood types in the general population. C can take on one of the values 
CJ, C2, C3, or C4, where, for example, C3 = "The blood type of the 
Culprit is AB," and A can similarly take on one of the values Al, A2, 
A3, or A4, where each corresponds to a particular blood type of the 
Accused. Immediately we have a much richer class of problem. At 
this stage, before the blood is typed, we have set up the system to 
handle any result possible. 
Examining node E more simply demonstrates the conditional 
probabilities associated with each of the nodes. Assume E = "An 
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eyewitness identifies the Accused as being at the scene,, or, we assume, 
not E" = "An eyewitness fails to identify the Accused as being at the 
scene." Before an identification lineup is held, one of the factors (and 
the only one charted in the figure) that affects the probability that the 
eyewitness will identify the Accused as having been present at the 
scene (E) is whether or not the Accused was present (H). Thus, E is 
conditionally dependent upon H, and the precise effect of H is de-
scribed by a conditional table (see Table 4) associated with node E. 
TABLE 4: CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES FORE GIVEN H 
P(EIH) 
E notE 
H 0.8 0.2 
not H 0.1 0.9 
These probability estimates (made before the identification lineup and 
based on background information) will be arrived at by considering 
the evidence in the individual case, such as the lighting, distance, time, 
and so forth relating to the circumstances in which the perpetrator 
was seen.49 These probabilities are coherent for each condition (the 
probabilities sum to one horizontally),50 but each condition has differ-
ent probabilities for E and not E. The asymmetry of this example 
doubtless reflects reality; the probability of an error depends upon pre-
cisely which error we are discussing. The probability that the witness 
would make a wrong identification of an innocent Accused, P(Elnot 
H) = 0.1, is not the same as the probability that the witness would fail 
to identify a guilty Accused, P(not EIH) = 0.2.51 
The probandum H has no entering arcs and is called a source node. 
The chartist must provide H with a prior probability based upon infor-
mation other than that being charted. Since the diagram shows the 
effect of evidence on probability assessments, there must be an initial 
assessment to be affected by the whole body of evidence. For example, 
prior information52 may lead us to the probabilities that P(H) = 0.001 
49. These factors are known in England and New Zealand as the Turnbull factors. See Re· 
gina v. Turnbull, [1977] 1 Q.B. 224 (1976). 
50. Clearly this must be the case because, ifthe accused was present, for example, either E or 
not E must occur. 
51. Lawyers have a naive concept of the "reliability of a witness," which implies that a wit· 
ness will have a consistent error rate determined by some internal factor such as honesty or 
competence. Obviously people tend to lie or make mistakes under pressure of circumstances. A 
self-serving lie is intuitively more likely than a self-disserving lie and becomes more likely as the 
cost of revealing the truth rises. See A.P. Dawid, The Difficulty About Conjunction, 36 THE 
STATISTICIAN 91 (1987). 
52. The expression "prior information" or "prior probability" simply means any information 
other than that being considered at present - or an assessment of probability based upon such 
information. It does not necessarily mean prior in time or order of consideration, but a conve-
nient example is a case where there is a fixed pool of 1,000 suspects and before considering any 
other evidence we might consider the probability of guilt for each of them to be 0.001. 
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and P(not H) = 0.999; odds of 1 to 999 that the Accused is the Cul-
prit or odds of 999 to 1 against the conclusion. 
Because the network conveys more information more precisely, it 
appears much more complicated than the corresponding Wigmore 
Chart. The complexity of the links between nodes B, C, and A reflect 
that they all depend on H and that B contains much, but not all, of the 
information available in the combined nodes A and C. B is redundant 
but is included here for comparison with the Wigmore Chart in Figure 
6. The generalization B * in Figure 6 is not charted in Figure 9 be-
cause it is embedded in the conditional probability table for B. Nodes 
A and C are connected in Figure 9 because, once one knows B and C, 
the value of A is determined. Because the network represents the com-
plete probability structure of the model before the truth of any propo-
sition has been asserted, it can process all possible combinations of 
evidence. It could determine, for example, the effect on H of the infor-
mation that the blood type of the Culprit is A (Cl) while that of the 
Accused is AB (A3); a combination that goes beyond merely inform-
ing the chartist of the proposition "not B." It can also flag impossible 
combinations of evidence, for example, Bl combined with CJ andA3. 
But once we have established one piece of evidence - for example, 
that the Culprit's blood type is X - the network simplifies considera-
bly and comes to resemble the Wigmore Chart in structure, though 
the arrows still point towards the evidence rather than towards the 
probandum. 
We can calculate the effect of asserting the truth of a piece of evi-
dence (such as the eyewitness evidence, E) by carrying out standard 
probability calculations. This is usually done by computer, but we can 
look at some simple examples. Asserting E to be true, we can calcu-
late the probability P(HIE). In our example, from the prior 
probability P(H) and the conditional probability table (P(EIH), Table 
4), we can calculate that the probability of H given E is now 0.0079 
(odds of about 125 to 1 against).53 Thus, the eyewitness evidence is 
not particularly strong but does cut down the odds against the 
probandum. 54 
In most cases the calculation can also be made using the likelihood 
ratios of the evidence, by comparing the ratio of the probability of 
getting the evidence if H is true to the probability of getting the evi-
dence if H is not true. 55 In our case the likelihood ratio of the eyewit-
ness evidence is 0.8/0. l = 8 (see Table 4). This is quite low. Some 
S3. The calculation uses Bayes' Rule, combining P(H) and P(EIH). P(HIE) = P(H). 
P(EIH)/P(E) = 0.001 X 0.8/0.1007 = 0.007944. P(E) is calculated by extension of the conver-
sion as 0.8 (0.001) + 0.1 (0.999) = 0.1007. 
S4. Much evidence will be assigned some probability rather than being regarded as certainly 
true. This complicates the calculations but poses no problem for a computer. 
SS. The likelihood ratio is equal to P(EIH)!P(Elnot H). Where H can take on more than 
two alternative values, the hypotheses can be compared two at a time. 
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scientific evidence can have ratios in the thousands or millions. Once 
we introduce the likelihood ratio of uncertain evidence, we can adjust 
the odds of the probandum H, which we previously determined to be 1 
to 999 that the Accused is the Culprit. The odds of probandum H, 
given the evidence E, are the odds before the evidence (1 to 999) multi-
plied by the likelihood ratio (8). This gives odds of 8 to 999 or 1 to 
125, for the probandum H, that the Accused is the Culprit. 
The evidential weight of asserting a second piece of evidence com-
bines with the weight of the previous evidence. If, for example, we 
assert B3 (both Culprit and Accused have blood type AB), this is 
equivalent to asserting both C3 and A3, each one by itself having no 
evidential weight on the probability of identity. If blood type AB has 
a frequency in the population of 1 in 50, this evidence has a likelihood 
ratio of 50. Thus, by itself, it would change the odds of H from 1 to 
999 to 50 to 999 or 1 to 19.9. 
The effect of combining the evidence, eyewitness (E) and blood 
type (B), is established by multiplying the two likelihood ratios to-
gether. 56 The combined weight of the evidence is (8)(50) = 400. This 
changes the odds in favor of H from 1 to 999 to 400 to 999 or about 1 
to 2.5. The posterior probability of H given E and Bl, p(HjE,Bl), is 
about 0.29. 
These calculations are all done by computer. Behind the scenes 
the calculations are represented on the network by changing the direc-
tions of the arcs (corresponding to calculating P(HjE) from P(EjH)) 
and updating the conditional probability tables. If the directions are 
changed so that the arcs point upward toward the probandum, addi-
tional links appear between the different pieces of evidence. These 
links correspond to the predictability of unknown evidence (say F) 
from known evidence (say Bl). Knowing Bl gives information about 
H, which, in turn, changes our probabilities for F before we learn 
about it in court. This sophisticated logic is much more difficult to 
recognize in an equivalent Wigmore Chart or decision tree. 
A Wigmore Chart in its classical form assumes a predetermined 
hypothesis and a body of evidence from a completed investigation. It 
is a snapshot of a problem at a particular instant in time and thus, as 
has been pointed out by many researchers, it fails to capture the dy-
namic, even messy, nature of real-life problems. 57 Bayes networks en-
able one to process information and to move from a description of the 
problem predata to a description of the problem postdata. One can 
even add evidence one piece at a time and examine the result at each 
step. Bayes networks are therefore more dynamic than Wigmore 
Charts. 
56. Because E and Bl are independent of each other. 
57. Peter A. Tillers & David Schum, Charting New Territory in Judicial Proof: Beyond Wig-
more, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 907, 941-51 (1988). 
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Despite this, the standard exposition of both Bayes networks and 
decision trees assumes a defined problem and a predetermined set of 
influences. It also implies a process neatly and clearly divisible into 
problem definition and data gathering. But knowledge of the problem 
is required in order to identify relevant influences. Moreover, as one 
acquires more knowledge, one may discover new effects which have to 
be investigated. The stages of the process are more interactive and 
dynamic than the model can describe. Research effort is now being 
devoted to determine how one formulates hypotheses and moves from 
one position capable of being represented by a Wigmore Chart to 
another.58 
The most obvious difference between Wigmore Charts and Bayes 
networks is that no mechanism for assessing probabilities exists in 
Wigmore Charts. Wigmore did provide a symbolic vocabulary to indi-
cate belief and disbelief in a proposition and to indicate whether a 
proposition supported or undermined the next higher proposition in 
the chain of inference. These symbols could show strength of belief in 
a crude way - one dot meant a proposition was believed, two dots 
meant it was strongly believed. Sensibly, he gave no instructions as to 
how to formulate these strengths of belief or how to combine them. 
Likewise, propositions affecting each other's value as evidence could 
be linked by horizontal lines (as in the link between propositions 18 
and 6 in Figure 1), but Wigmore did not explain how these influences 
were to be incorporated. Such interactions are handled routinely us-
ing conditional probability matrices in Bayes networks. 
A Wigmore Chart tends to expand as more and more steps in the 
reasoning are teased out. This often involves making explicit the gen-
eralizations on which steps in reasoning are based. In drawing a Bayes 
network, in contrast, these generalizations tend to disappear into the 
conditional probability tables for the nodes. 
The suggested modifications to the Wigmore structure make a 
Wigmore Chart more closely resemble a Bayes network. This need 
not cause alarm, because computer software is available to handle any 
of the calculations. The lawyer needs to perform three tasks: to estab-
lish the evidential structure of the case, to incorporate data from wit-
nesses, and, where no expert assessment is available, to make 
judgments about the value of that evidence. As with the Wigmore 
Chart, lucidity is required, not computational skill. We are confident 
that versions of Bayes network software specially designed for legal 
cases will soon be available. 
Wigmore's system is therefore quite consistent with modem meth-
ods of decision analysis but incomplete, as he himself recognized. In 
fact, the similarities in concept between Bayes networks and Wig-
58. Schum & Tillers, supra note 23. 
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more's "attempt at a working method" identify Wigmore as one of the 
unrecognized forefathers of modem decision analysis methods. Law-
yers, however, need to be aware that other methods are now 
accessible. 
CONCLUSION 
Our conclusion, therefore, is that probability as logic points the 
way to the integration of the disparate strands in the new evidence 
scholarship by uniting Wigmorian and Bayesian analysis. Elsewhere 
we argue that probability as logic also solves the problems identified 
by Twining and other doubters about probabilistic analysis of legal 
cases.59 
Analysis of Evidence is one part, and a valuable part, of a project in 
which Twining has helped to revitalize the study of evidence and 
proof. As the authors frequently remind us, the book has been some 
ten years in gestation. In the meantime others, some stimulated by 
Twining and Anderson, have advanced understanding of fact analysis 
in a number of ways. The climb that brought us to our present views 
began with our standing on the shoulders of Twining and Anderson, 
but it has also been helped by the recent writing of Ronald Allen, 
Richard Friedman, David Schum, Peter Tillers, and others. Some of 
this writing is referred to in the Manual, but the themes pursued are 
not integrated into the text of Analysis of Evidence. This means that 
the book will not give a comprehensive "feel" for what has recently 
been going on in the field unless it is read in conjunction with the 
Manual and the references therein. Nonetheless, Analysis of Evidence 
is a welcome new venture in the proselytization of fact analysis and an 
excellent starting point for law teachers new to the area. 
59. Robertson & Vignaux, supra note 38. 
